Collective Security and Small arms Control an Africa: Understanding the Structure and Challenges

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Abstract
Small arms and light weapons are very valuable international market commodities that proliferate along economic patterns of demand and supply. Consequent upon this, the control of small arms proliferation within the African region has proved to be very intractable. This is partly due to the ever-present demand factors found within conflicts in the historical fabric of the Continent. This study examines the basic structure of collective security available on the continent for the purpose of small arms control. An analysis of the synergy between United Nations instruments and regional instruments highlights the challenges that are inherent in the process of collective security in small arms control. The paper highlights the problems of international control and how they relate to regional control instruments, with key findings revealing that non-state actors hold the key to advancing the cause of control efforts where state actors have enabled proliferation. The paper advocates the policy options of increased and effective domestication of international control instruments and their upgrade to legally binding status.

Key Words: Small Arms, Collective Security, Instruments, Arms Control, Africa.

Introduction
The control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa is a challenge that is very complicated indeed. The demand side factors that create streams of proliferation are often domiciled within countries. Legitimate streams like government procurement are mostly dwarfed by conflict based demand patterns. The convoluted nature of small arms control is further compounded by the fact that small arms are market commodities and therefore sustainable small arms control is essentially challenged by two
basic economic forces. One is the ever-growing international arms market that feeds supply and the second is the debilitating local insecurity and armed conflicts that provide the demand. The supply side of the market is so entrenched that the international control systems that has been evolving over the years are confronted with a daunting crusade against a global market system that is intricately interwoven with regions, governments, multi-national corporations, illegal arms dealers, and embargo bursting cartels.

Regardless it is clear that a two-pronged approach to small arms control is the most practical in stemming both demand and supply. First is collective security that utilizes sub-regional, regional and global platforms of collective cooperation for the purpose of arms control. The second is the bottom-up approach involving state, civil society and individual action.

The United Nations provides the most visible global platform for a collective approach to small arms control. The foremost instruments in the UN system consisted of the United Nations Firearms Protocol; The United Nations programme of (UNPoA); the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These have for more than a decade provided the guiding principles for action on small arms control in Africa and the world at large. At the African regional level countries cooperating through regional and sub-regional organizations like the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) seek to advance collective security regarding small arms control in a manner that will compliment the bottom-up approach and thus create the proper local-international synergy to stem SALW proliferation. At the regional and sub-regional levels, instruments created by regional organizations have proved crucial in this synergy. Most prominent among these are the ECOWAS Convention, The Bamako Initiative, The Nairobi Protocol and The SADC Protocol. This paper thus attempts an analysis of the collective security of small arms control in Africa and the attendant challenges that these processes confront.

**Collective Security and International Instruments of Small Arms Control**

The Principle of Collective Security has remained the most viable platform for the aggregation of efforts towards the control of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Africa. This, however, comes with a backdrop of a
long history of multilateral efforts to limit conflict by regulation of arms control. The first attempt to address this issue in a comprehensive way emerged in 1945 with the adoption of the UN Charter which, in its preamble, committed the members to “unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” and, in article 1, to take “collective measures”. A link between international peace and security and armaments was made in article 11 of the UN Charter which stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principle of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may also make recommendations to the members or to the Security Council or to both.

Since then, the United Nations System has provided various instruments and agencies that are dedicated to disarmament and arms control. The most prominent of these instruments in reference to small arms control are interrogated below with emphasis on their levels of domestication among African Nations for the purpose of collective security.

**The UN Firearms Protocol.**

Although arms control and disarmament have been a part of the United Nations system as far back as 1945, the control of small arms in particular as a distinct aspect of international collective collaboration became more pronounced in the post-Cold War Era. The United Nations firearms protocol represents one of the earliest international instruments that is presently used to foster collective security in Africa. The Firearms protocol was adopted by the UN General Assembly in May 2001 (Resolution 55/255) as part of the May 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). This convention was supplemented by three protocols that addressed (1) trafficking in persons (2) the smuggling of migrants. (3) and the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms. It is the third of these, i.e UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition that has become commonly known as the Firearms Protocol.

After its adoption in 2005, it became legally binding for states that have ratified it. The Firearms Protocols is very critical to the collective security of small arms control in Africa because it created the significant precedent of establishing that illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms are criminal offences. It was also responsible for identifying tracing and law enforcement cooperation as the primary tools to assist
investigators and prosecutors in combating these crimes and more importantly it became the first legally binding global instrument on small arms.5

It is important to observe that the levels of collective security where the firearms Protocols engages the African nations involved are in relation to the overall purpose of the UNTOC which is 'to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively'.6 In this regard, the Firearms protocol promotes, facilitates and strengthens cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.7

United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA)
The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is widely known as the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA). This instrument was adopted in 2001 as politically binding. It covers a wide range of small arms control measures for regional and global levels of collective security. These include the manufacture and international transfers; criminal offences; marking, record-keeping, and tracing; stockpile management; surplus identification and disposal; brokering controls; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; public awareness programmes; and international cooperation and assistance. 8

The International Tracing Instrument (ITI)
The International Tracing Instrument (ATT) was adopted in 2005 as a politically binding instrument that allows nations to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. It is closely related to the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA) and focuses on the issues of marking, record-keeping, and tracing of small arms and light weapons through international cooperation.9

Although the working mechanics of collective security platforms in Africa are geared towards collaboration with UN and European Union (EU) systems, several problems of international control adversely affect the efficient functioning of the regional and sub-regional collective security platforms on the African continent. Below is an interrogation of these processes.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral instrument that regulates the international transfer of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons. The ATT was adopted on 2 April 2013 by General Assembly Resolution 67/234 B and entered into force on 24 December 2014. Unlike the ITI, the ATT establishes legally binding commitments governing the international trade comprising the export, import, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons.

The international instruments discussed above are complimented by those created by the regional and sub-regional organisation on the African continent. These instruments seek to strengthen the global consensus by creating cooperative platform for African states to domicile the UN instruments and also strengthen the structures of collective security for small arms control through local instruments created to meet indigenous realities. The African Union's (AU) Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Bamako, 30 Nov. 2000.

In the wake of the Bamako declaration, the African Union called for a Solemn Declaration in 2013 by African Heads of State (Agenda 2063). The declaration was drafted to provide a strategic framework for Africa’s socio-economic transformation over the next 50 years. The leaders pledged not to bequeath the burden of conflict to the next generation and to end all conflict on the continent by 2020. From this declaration emerged what the AU referred to as the Amnesty Month for the Surrender and Collection of Illicit Weapons in September 2017. This is conceived as an annual event.

Under the AU, sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS have since 1998 blazed a trail in collective security on small arms control. The Moratorium that the West African Heads of State arrived at in that year subsequently matured in 2006 into the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials. In central Africa, the 11 ECCAS members are potentially covered by a convention similar in scope and ambition to the 2006 ECOWAS Convention, The Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that Can Be
Used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly.¹⁴

The ECCAS convention was negotiated by the UN Standing Advisory Committee on security questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) and adopted in 2010 at a meeting in Kinshasa (and is therefore commonly referred to as the Kinshasa Convention). However, the Kinshasa Convention is not yet in force as it still needs to be ratified by two-thirds of its signatory states, including the DRC.¹⁵ In southern Africa, The South African Development Community (SADC) is also working with similar instruments of collective security. Its SADC firearms Protocol is implemented by the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) whose main function is to promote regional cooperation in terms of developing joint strategies on cross-border and related crimes.¹⁶ In 2007, SARPCCO established the Regional Coordinating Committee, whose mandate is to spearhead the implementation of the SADC Firearms Protocol.¹⁷

In Eastern Africa, the states of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa negotiated and signed the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa in March 2000. They subsequently signed the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and The Horn of Africa which came into force on 5th May 2006.¹⁸ A collective security platform monitoring and implementation of this instrument was created in 2005. The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA).

Although no North African sub-regional organisation has established collective security instruments in the sub-region, the UN—through its various agencies has implemented a number of projects and activities involving states in the region. These have mostly focused on firearms and SALW controls, in particular in the areas of stockpile management and destruction.¹⁹ An example of this is the flexible multi-donor UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCR).²⁰

**Arms Control Problems at the International Level of Collective Security Affecting Africa.**

From the regional to the global level of small arms control, every huddle creates a ripple effect that trickles down to the national levels among African states. This is basically because small arms and light weapons are international market commodities produced and distributed by a vast
collection of manufacturers, brokers and arms dealers. The inability to control them at the international level ensures local supply at the national levels. Consequently, most of these problems originate from flaws in the collective security structures at global and regional levels.

**The Problem of Controlling Surplus.**
The post-Cold War small arms international market was hugely impacted by the collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex. This created several problems for small arms control in the sense that it made possible the flooding of the arms market with surplus weapons. Surplus weapons are however a predictable consequence of changing security requirements, defense restructuring and re-equipment programme. This is because States periodically have to dispose of significant quantities of surplus small arms and ammunition in order to make room for better and more advanced models.21

The 1997 UN General Assembly Resolution on SALW encouraged states to destroy surplus weapons. Furthermore, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2000 agreed on a politically binding document on small arms that surplus weapons should be destroyed. However, the position of the international community on the responsible disposal of small arms surplus has not been reflected in the practices of several European countries especially those of the former Soviet bloc.22 A marked deficiency in the provision of resources and political will is observable in their practices. The disposal of surplus is encouraged to be swift and possibly at a profit, thus encouraging diversions into the international arms market. The larger part of these weapons eventually makes their way to non-state actor in Africa via illicit arms brokers.23 The implication of this development is that, the failure of collective security in OSCE raises the challenge of stemming the flow of supply on the part collective security platforms in Africa.

**Problems of the Black and Gray Small Arms Markets**
Post Cold War increase in the number of munitions companies has reduced the ability of governments to control the manufacture, possession and trade in small arms thus giving room for an increased number of illicit producers.24 Apart from increasing the number of illicit producers this development has further compounded the issue of illicit transfers, making the movement of small arms more widely diffused and difficult to track.

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons can only run
successfully with the complicity of the state-run apparatus. Corrupt police, customs and other law enforcement officials all form the upper structure that sustains the trade. The illegal disposal of surplus weapons also follows this pattern. Since the legal trade in small arms faces "commission payments" and kickbacks to military and government personnel that are meant to facilitate contracts, it is obvious that the illicit trade would also exploit these loopholes of corrupt practices that have already been put in place. Illicit transfers fall into different categories, they range from the activities of illegal arms dealers, (referred to as the black market) to secret government transfers like those of the CIA to groups or governments that might eventually become African or global security risks. These are referred to as the grey areas of the market. The grey market also involves the diversion of legal transfers to third party end users that are not legally qualified to obtain such weapons.

The activities of illegal arms dealers in the black market have also proved challenging to international small arms control. Men like Victor Bout and Leonid Minin have been known to conduct embargo bursting transfers to rebel groups and blacklisted governments in defiance of UN embargoes. Most of the weapons that finally reach militants in the delta and terrorist in the northeast of the country are usually arranged by international arms dealers like Bout and Minin.

**The problem of International Transparency and Ratification.**

One of the key factors that enable the sustenance of the black and grey markets of international illicit small arms transfers is the lack of international transparency. Transparency will enable the detection of illicit flow of arms into the black market and also plug other channels of corruption that make the tracking of weapons difficult. Although a certain level of transparency is being recorded over small arms production and transfers, there still remain areas of serious concern. Lack of transparency from Russia and China who are members of the five permanent members of the security council is counter-productive to the control process. Their reluctance to expose the detail of their arms transfers creates a major problem for international small arms control because they happen to be among the largest arms producer and exporters in the world. Aside from this, the majority of the small arms and light weapons finding their way to Africa originate from these countries also representing a major problem for sub-regional collective security systems on the control of small arms and
light weapons.

It is also a lack of commitment to transparency and collective security that cause some nations to decline the ratification of small arms control treaties. Over a decade after the negotiations were completed, the Firearms Protocol continues to lag behind in terms of ratifications when compared to its sister protocols and UNTOC. In April 2014, there were 179 states parties to UNTOC; 159 states parties to the Protocol on Trafficking in Persons; 138 states parties to the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants; and 109 states parties to the Firearms Protocol.18 As of March 2019, parties to the protocol had increased to 117 parties, including 115 states and the European Union while 52 of these are signatories. This still shows a clear shortfall in relation to the other protocols

The issue of transparency also affects the domestication of the ATT among African Nations. Most of the African signatories to the ATT have failed to provide reports on the implementation progress of the ATT. As at 2016, the Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP 2) recorded only seven out of 54 African countries who had entered a self-assessment file. Secondly majority of the country profiles were withheld from the public on the ATT-BAP website.19

The Problem of Transfer Controls

The key loophole that allows for illegal diversion of small arms and light weapons into Africa is the very porous international regime of transfer controls. This has created room for most African countries to be used as conduits for the transfer of weapons to nations that cannot obtain end-user certificates for weapons because they are under a UN arms embargo or other forms of sanctions.20 Several African Conflicts have seen the complicity of European nations in contravening international instruments of small arms control. During the Nigerian Civil War, for instance, France funnelled weapons through the then Ivory Coast to the Biafrans while the Liberian Civil War saw several West African nations transferring weapons to different factions in the conflict.21 In order to enhance the collaborative structure for the collective security of SALW control, dependable regimes of international transfer controls have to be created to cover second and third party users.

When the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA) was negotiated in July 2001, the general agreement was that the effective regulation of small arms trade would depend on licensing transfers to be
based on commonly agreed standards. These should take into cognizance
explicit authorizations by the exporting, importing and transit States of small arms and light weapons. However, the international community did not capitalize on this agreement during the final drafting of the UNPoA, resulting in only broad and consequently limited reference to what is required from states with regard to transfer controls, even at regional and national levels of collective security.

The UK government and other partners have created the Transfer Control Initiative in an attempt to reposition the issue in the global arena of small arms controls discuss. The purpose of the initiative is to build consensus among diverse regions on the need for common international controls on SALW transfers and to facilitate the process of developing common international controls on small arms as recognized in the UNPoA. Without this general consensus, the grey areas of arms transfers will continue to be exploited for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons thereby impacting negatively on the success of collective security in Africa.

**Status of Ammunitions.**

One of the critical challenges to security cooperation among nations in the area of small arms control still remains in the Status of Ammunitions. The PoA contains no specific reference to the issue of ammunition. The word ammunition appears only twice, both times in connection with titles of other UN documents. Consequently, in 1997, the United Nations Panel of Experts had acknowledged that 'munitions and explosives form an integral part of the small arms and light weapons used in conflicts' and recommended that the UN prepare a study on 'all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives. This was not properly clarified.

The reluctance to confront the issue of ammunition also characterized subsequent efforts to develop multilateral marking and tracing commitments, such as the International Tracing Instrument. While the United Nations Group of Government Experts (GGE) unanimously concluded that it was both 'desirable' and 'feasible' to develop an international tracing instrument, it left two important issues unresolved: whether the instrument was to be legally or politically binding in character and whether to include ammunition and explosives within the scope of the exercise.

As a consequence, the General Assembly did not specify whether ammunition or explosives were to be discussed when determining the
Open-Ended Working Group's (OEWG) negotiating mandate. Secondly, it did not decide whether the instrument would be legally or politically binding, leaving this matter for the negotiations. As a result of this, the subsequent International Tracing Instrument (ITI) negotiations were almost derailed by the question of instrument character. Most delegations either supported the inclusion of ammunition in the scope of the instrument (with the European Union leading the charge) or opposed its inclusion (with the United States being the most vocal opponent). Ultimately, the result of the debate was that ammunition was omitted from the scope of the ITI. This has not helped the cause of small arms control in Africa especially. 

Challenges of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

According to the United Nations General Assembly,

The absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms is a contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism, thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development

This global consensus regarding the need for a concerted and unified approach to control regimes at the global stage had been very difficult to attain because of divergent political and economic interest. The inability of the international community to create this platform has become a key structural problem to the control system for small arms and light weapons at all levels of collective security. An International Alert report on SALW transfer controls identifies a central area of discordant tunes in the international community in the following statement:

The problem is that states appear to disagree about: which international law is relevant; the extent to which some of these laws are binding on them; and the scope of their existing responsibilities under laws they accept, where they relate to SALW transfers. For example, a few states appear to dislike any specific reference to human rights laws and obligations in relation to SALW transfers but do not want to find themselves in the diplomatically difficult situation of explicitly disowning them. Their solution is to try to avoid or postpone any detailed international discussion of the whole area. Many other states are willing in principle to agree to political guidelines requiring them to take risks of human rights or humanitarian into account when deciding whether to authorize a SALW transfer, but are reluctant to agree to specific interpretations of
international law in this respect. The most prominent opposition to a global arms trade treaty (ATT) came from the United States of America which happens to be the largest exporter of arms in the world. She leads all countries in both arms transfer agreements and arms deliveries to developing nations, concluding $6.9 billion in transfer agreements and $9.6 billion in arms deliveries with developing nations in 2004 alone. By 2015 these transfer agreements had reached $26.7 billion. The US alongside several other nations, maintain a position that legitimizes legal access to small arms by non-state actors. They also hesitate over a consensus regarding the need for a set of guidelines that would make access difficult or impossible.

During the Bush administration, for instance, the US rejected the move to initiate ATT discussions because it included a ban on weapons sales to non-state actors. She acted as an obstructionist state in moving the UN small arms process forward and in some cases even loosened its own export standards to win allies in the War on Terror. The US had for years used weapons transfers as instruments of foreign policy and had transferred weapons both legally and by covert means to governments all over the world. The United States position on weapons transfers to non-state actors in informed by the fact that these transfers constitute an important aspect of US foreign policy objectives. Hence, consenting to international pressure would mean allowing the international community to dictate the tools available for conducting US foreign policy. This for them is unacceptable.

In-spite of the coming into force of the ATT, the above discussed problem still persists and remains a key impediment to collective security platforms in Africa preventing non-state actors from acquiring weapons.

The Globalisation of Small Arms Production and Distribution.

Last but not least is the globalisation of small arms production and distribution which represents the most potent obstacle to the collective security of global, regional and national small arms control. The weapons that eventually appear in Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Liberia or any African country are directly connected to the International arms market that had become caught up in the concept of globalisation in the post-Cold War era. Globalisation is defined variously as a process of increasing, political, economic and social interdependence. It is an integrative process where the capital, concepts, traded goods, images, ideas, persons, and values diffuse across state boundaries.

The process of globalisation is a key factor in the loosening of global
trade restrictions over virtually all forms of trade. This has made policing more difficult and has proved inimical to global small arms control in the sense that it has made the proliferation of stockpiles as fluid as newly produced small arms. The emergent slackness in trade regimes and tariffs have rather fuelled international smuggling of illicit arms turning arms brokers and dealers into new venture capitalists, exploiting the gains of globalisation.\textsuperscript{64}

A combination of globalisation and end of the Cold War has virtually restructured the international arms market. Surplus weapons in nations of the former Soviet Union and also the U.S. were rechanneled into the open market to be taken over by the forces of demand and supply. Since government procurement from arms companies was hugely truncated by the end of the Cold War, these companies had to look elsewhere. Hence sustaining the military industrial complex meant new sales outlets and by extension a change in the governing principles of arms transfers.

During the Cold War, the international arms market was a bit regulated because the need to restrict the flow of weapons had security implications for either the USSR or the United States. The U.S. government exempted the conventional weapons trade from its general advocacy of free trade and closely collaborated with allies to limit conventional arms proliferation.\textsuperscript{65} Both sides in the Cold War conflict could not afford to allow these weapons to get into the hands of nations in the opposing camps hence small arms and light weapons proliferated more along ideological patterns than economic patterns. With the end of the Cold War however, the ideological and security restrictions gave way to a free market system. Anybody could buy anything on the market.

Most importantly, the shift in American policy on this matter became hugely unbalanced in favour of economics rather than security. As the highest producer and exporter of small arms and light weapons, the United States has had a huge impact on the behaviour of the global arms market and by extension control efforts. While the US government may call a lot of attention to national security, it is, however, clear from the mounting value of US small arms transfers in the post-Cold War era that the proliferation of small arms is not properly captured within the purview of national security. Tamar Gabelnick and Anna Rich in their study on globalized weaponry claim that,

\textit{At least 154 out of 190 independent countries got contracts for or deliveries of American arms in the fiscal year 2000, according}
to the U.S. government. From 1995-97, U.S. based firms profited from a 55% share of the global arms market (up from roughly a third during the cold war), exporting four times more than its closest competitor Britain. U.S. arms deliveries have also increased in absolute terms from $23 billion in 1987 to almost $32 billion in 1997.47

Clearly, the economic interest of the US was beginning to take precedence over security in the post-Cold War era. For instance, in a 1995 United States Presidential Decision Directive, the Clinton administration maintained the position for the first time that upheld US economic interest as a crucial policy consideration when making arms transfer decisions.48 The administration claimed that foreign sales maintain defence-related skills and infrastructure in the U.S. at a time of reduced U.S. government arms procurement, thereby creating lower per-unit costs for U.S. weapons procurement.49

Russia, on the other hand, remains the second largest producer of small arms and light weapons globally.50 Just like the Americans, Russia previously restricted production to mostly security purposes however the end of the Cold War and the realignment of The Russian Federation to the global economy has compelled a similar rethink of production goals with economics and profit dominating the sector. Over the last two decades, the Russian Federation has been in the process of consolidating its arms industry for the global market.

In 2002 and 2003, all Russian developers and manufacturers of small arms and light weapons were merged into two major government-owned holding companies. The High Precision Weapons Corporation was set up in 2002 bringing together manufacturers of light weapons, primarily non-portable surface to air missiles. It centred on the Instrument Building Design Bureau and others while the Small Arms and Cartridge Corporation set up in 2003, saw the merger of 12 companies with JSC Izhmash as the core company.51 These mergers characterize an industry that is rising to meet the challenges of a global market that has become increasingly competitive. From the US to Europe, Russia and China the third largest producer of small arms and light weapons, companies are merging nationally and international to create a formidable arms market supported by neoliberal economic principles.

The implication of this trend of globalisation on small arms control in Africa is indeed debilitating. The bigger the mergers the lesser the oversight
control from governments. Furthermore, with increased mergers have also come increased diversification another trend in globalisation. Diversification of small arms production due to globalisation essentially expands production capacity and creates greater numbers of production locations. The transfer and globalisation of weapons technology and production tripled since the sixties. During that period, less than five major conventional weapon systems were licensed for production in developing countries. Cold War rivalries that initially maintained early patterns of technology transfer in form of licensed production to Soviet and US allies quickly gave way to economic driven patterns after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. These new patterns are characterized by collaborative production and assemblage of the weapons.

The risks inherent in licensed production create more difficulty in maintaining product or brand control by the original owners of the weapon design. The weapons that licensed countries produce cannot be monitored by the original country of the weapons origin because arms and military hardware can be utilized by the security forces of the host nation or exported to any third party who may be non-state actors. Consequently, very few governments ever bring effective controls to bear on licensed production deals. As a result, the countries who own the original weapons design retain little or no control over production levels. Herein resides the problems globalisation has created for the control of small arms and light weapons.

The globalisation of the AK 47 rifle is a perfect example illustrating the situation. The production of this weapon is spread globally across fourteen countries which include Russia, Nigeria, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Venezuela, North Korea, China, Germany, Iraq, Egypt, India and Hungary. The OBJ 006 is currently being produced at Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria as Nigeria's variant of the Kalashnikov assault rifle AK 47. Weapons manufacturers in other countries have used the AK 47 blueprint to develop other variants of the assault rifle. Countries like Israel, South Africa and Finland have used this process to develop weapons like the Finish Sako M60, M62, and M76, the Israeli Galil ARM/AR assault rifles, and the South African R4.

Although several attempts are being made by governments to regulate licensed production, very little success is being recorded because of the lack of global principles governing the production and export of these
In the Russian and Venezuelan case, for instance, the Russians had granted Venezuela the license in July 2006 to reproduce the AK 103 Assault rifle on the condition that unauthorized exports would not be made outside of Russian consent. The lack of a global control regime as at the terminal date of this study still represents a key impediment to the control of global production, transfers and usage of small arms and light weapons. This underscores the need for an ATT.57

Conclusion
Maintaining effective control over the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa has faced several daunting challenges. In addressing these challenges, there is a need to revisit the commitment of African Nations to collective security. Most of the weapons that enter the country are smuggled in through international waters or neighbouring countries. The platform created by the Sub-regional organizations endorses state cooperation that is intended to build better border policing against illicit trafficking in small arms.

The policy direction that will effectively engage this problem lies in domestication of international, regional and sub-regional instruments designed to control the flow, circulation and use of small arms and light weapons. Secondly the arms control instruments at the international level have been vague on the issue of Status of Ammunition. For Africa it is critical that this issue be clearly articulated to the extent of extending restrictions over ammunitions too. The same measure of control over weapons must be extended to cover ammunition.

At Africa's regional level, the question of 'instrument character' must be negotiated within legally binding parameters. The politically binding character of most of the instruments makes them very difficult to enforce. This has weakened control efforts across board and made collective security platforms ineffective in enforcing control measures.

Proliferation of small arms will continue in Africa as long as demand and economic incentive for supply is available. This situation can only be addresses when aspects of demand are eliminated by addressing economic factors, structural violence and insecurity within African societies that anchor demand for small arms. In eliminating these sources of demand, greater resource governance should be integrated as part of the collective security approach to control to forestall their transformation to conflict resources because these resources are the ones that sustain demand in the
first place. Solving institutional and structural problems that confront security governance and reforms should consequently take priority in small arms control.

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